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Abstract
Current authentication protocols seek to establish authenticated sessions over
insecure channels while maintaining a small footprint considering the energy
consumption and computational overheads. Traditional authentication schemes
must store a form of authentication data on the devices, putting this data at
risk. Approaches based on purely public/private key infrastructure come with
additional computation and maintenance costs. This work proposes a novel non-
interactive zero-knowledge (NIZKP) authentication protocol that incorporates
the limiting factors in IoT communication devices and sensors. Our proto-
col considers the inherent network instability and replaces the ZKP NP-hard
problem using the Merkle tree structure for the creation of the authentication
challenge. A series of simulations evaluate the performance of NIZKP against
traditional ZKP approaches based on graph isomorphism. A set of performance
metrics has been used, namely the channel rounds for client authentication, ef-
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fects of the authentication processes, and the protocol interactions to determine
areas of improvements. The simulation results indicate empirical evidence for
the suitability of our NIKP approach for authentication purposes in resource-
constrained IoT environments.
Keywords: IoT, ZKP, NIZKP, Authentication, WSN, ANOVA.
1. Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm has become the driving factor for
the exponential increase of inter-connected devices and sensors. These devices
have gradually evolved from sensing the environment to data processing and
decision-making. These enabled better user experience, but also, an alarmingly5
increased attack surface against traditional confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability aspects [1]. The “things” are connected via wireless links to form complex
and often pervasive Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) with suitable resources
and interfaces to information that can be relayed back to source nodes.
There is a variety of applications for IoT ranging from wearable comput-10
ing, healthcare to supply chain monitoring and military [2],[3],[4],[5], [6], [7].
The necessity to authenticate entities (participants) and attribute associated
actions in WSN is of paramount importance [8]. The communication in these
networks often includes unauthenticated participants allowing threat actors to
abuse network components in a variety of ways. This abuse is often manifested15
as targetted and multi-stage cyber attacks, passive or active eavesdropping, De-
nial of Service (DoS) and the insertion of rogue sensors affecting the integrity
and availability of data [9]. The increase in intra-sensor communication in WSN
opens a new area of attacks, since a participant can aggregate modified messages
from different participants within the network. Given that malicious nodes can20
access network resources arbitrarily, the security of these aggregation processes
that often include data processing is also essential for the efficacy and feasibility
of these networks [10].
Due to the broadcast nature of WSN, different vector of attacks can be man-
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Figure 1: Attacks in WSN [11].
ifested at the network layer. A malicious node can selectively drop packets and25
actively or passively inspect traffic. The assumption is that often these nodes
are considered trustworthy when they forward messages within the network [11],
[12]. Compromised nodes can be used as sinkholes to concentrate network traf-
fic and perform traffic analysis to identify communication patterns. In Sybil
attacks, a malicious node can co-exist in multiple locations in an attempt to30
compromise fault-tolerant schemes affecting both data integrity and availability
to legitimate resources [13]. In addition, malicious nodes can also record and
re-play packets in different locations within the target network. This type of at-
tack known as wormhole, is particularly dangerous as it gives a false perception
of proximity to legitimate nodes. It also prevents routing packets from being35
discovered [14]. Fig. 1 illustrates the main WSN attack categories in terms of
their impact.
Strict requirements prior IoT deployment such as aggregation processes and
secure integration of services within the network should be considered [15]. In
addition, the limited IoT object resources, namely, computation and processing40
must also be considered when designing authentication protocols for IoT sys-
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tems. Standards such as IEEE 802.14.4-2015 have been created for the physical
and MAC layers to tackle some of these problems [16]. When examining the
requirements for authentication protocols, the assumption is that semantic se-
curity is offered in WSN and the communication architecture within which the45
protocols will operate is well established.
The communication architecture is often described by criteria such as the
key generation process, the number of participants using the protocol and the
mechanisms used to derive session keys. However, where collaborative functions
such as data aggregation and node referrals require processing, this can directly50
contradict the security objectives even if the security requirements have been
made explicit as part of the protocols’ specifications. When proposing security
schemes for WSN, the challenge of maintaining the functionality and network
efficiency dictates careful security design and implementation. This challenge
increases in locations where network reliability is intermittent and where nodes55
are in locations where they could be physically compromised [17].
The development of a computationally sound NIZKP challenge value would
allow the mitigation of certain threats against authentication assuming that
each challenge value is encrypted. The Verifier V must both be able to decrypt
the challenge, proving that there is a shared secret key between the Prover P60
and V preventing impersonation attacks. Extending the security of the chal-
lenge packet, the P could include their Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) in
the final packet encrypted with the server UUID provided in the initial client
server exchange. In addition to confidentiality, should the server decrypt the
final packet value, and this does not match the expected server UUID, the au-65
thentication challenge can be rejected. Using this extended functionality, from
a NIZKP server a log can be generated to store three values, the client UUID,
the server UUID and the public challenge for a session. A query of this log
every time a client requests authentication would check if the client UUID,
server UUID or the public challenge had been used previously, either together70
or individually. This simple log would provide a multitude of information that
could be used in security operation monitoring, performance monitoring and
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auditing efforts [18], [19], [20]. An auditing function would be vital to monitor-
ing and reporting on login frequency and malicious login attempts in otherwise
unsupervised environments.75
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we discuss
existing works in the field of ZKP with emphasis upon authentication design
principles of existing protocols. Section 3 focuses on the design and testing of
our NIZKP protocol with a detailed explanation of the authentication modules
constituting the building blocks using a non-interactive approach. Section 480
presents the results and discussion from our experiments and the evaluation
of NIZKP using formal statistical methods against the data produced by our
simulations and existing ZKP approaches. In Section 5 we present the threat
model for our NIZKP protocol with a description of both threat vectors and
mitigations. Finally, Section 6 concludes this work and gives future avenues.85
2. Related Works
In IoT systems the requirement for strong security procedures, especially
application layer security, has led to the development of multiple authentication
protocols, usually modelled on traditional authentication approaches. These
schemes are often based on login credentials with stored authentication val-90
ues or private/public key schemes. Attacks can originate from traditionally
expected adversaries located inside or outside the network or from previously
trusted nodes acting maliciously [21],[22],[23]. Recent advancements in wearable
wireless sensors with quality requirements namely, energy, memory, and compu-
tational efficiency further incorporate ZKP to provide lightweight authentication95
with appropriate commitment schemes [24], [25]. ZKP has also been used as a
mean to implement web security models for information exchange over insecure
channels.
The authors of [26] have introduced a robust authentication scheme over
a secure communication channel in which the registration and login processes100
for entities is demonstrated. Registered entities can submit their queries to the
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network within a specific timeframe utterly independent of the application time
and only while they move within a designated zone within this time. Should
any of these requirements fail, the participant must re-register to the network
through this scheme. The scheme is proved to be susceptible to impersonation,105
stolen V credentials and gateway bypass attacks. An enhanced version of this
scheme was introduced in [27] that eliminates some of the attack vectors. This
process has been achieved through changes in the authentication steps to include
separate phases during login and registration and the addition of a password
change capability. However, the enhanced version of the scheme was also found110
vulnerable to password guessing and impersonation attacks.
The authors in [28] introduced a mutual authentication scheme with session
key agreement between a user and an object. Traditional password authentica-
tion has been used for the gateway access with a secret generated and stored
on different devices within the system. These devices become designated to115
serve requests from the user. A smart card was also introduced during the login
process to enable the device to calculate whether the request has been done
within an acceptable timeframe for the session key to be created. Most of the
techniques mentioned above rely on user-supplied information at the stage of
transfering credentials that are stored to devices within the network. These lim-120
itations in existing authentication mechanisms can be partially addressed by the
use of Zero-Knowledge proofs (ZKP). ZKPs are considered the cornerstone of
modern cryptography on the premise that a proof can be both convincing and
yet revealing no information other than the validity of the claim made. The
conversation between the P and V must convince the latter about the Prove’s125
claim without the P revealing the details that construct the evidence. The ex-
change of information must assure beyond any reasonable doubt the validity of
P ′s claim to V . Often this process is repetitive until the legitimacy of P ′s is
fully established. In each step, a reducing probability of 12
n
enables P to guess
a response to the challenge presented by V . An inappropriate response to the130
challenge breaks the authentication process. There is no prior knowledge of the
secret, nor changes are possible to publicly shared values without re-executing
6
the commitment protocol. A variation of the ZKP is the Non-Interactive Zero
knowledge Proof (NIZKP), in which there is no continuous interaction between
V and the P as in the manner of the ZKP. The P still wishes to assure beyond135
doubt their claim of validity to the V , however, rather than reply in multiple
interactive challenge rounds between the P and V , the ZKP proofs are com-
puted and then distributed by the P to the V . The V can then validate multiple
claims without the need to reissue challenges thus reducing computation and
communication overhead. In the case of bounded NIZKP the following applies:140
Given that a random string σ and a single sufficient theorem T , the algorithm
outputs in a non-interactive manner a second string in zero-knowledge that T is
true for any V who has access to the same string σ. The authors of [29] define
the bounded NIZKP scheme as follows:
Completeness: For all x ∈ Ln and for sufficient large n,
Pr(σ
R←− {0, 1}nc ;Proof R←− Prover(σ, x) : V erifier(σ, x, Proof) = 1 > 2/3
(1)
soundness: For all x ∈ Ln for all turing machines Prover’, and for all sufficiently
large n,
Pr(σ
R←− {0, 1}nc ;Proof R←− Prover′(σ, x) : V erifier(σ, x, Proof) = 1 < 2/3
(2)
145
Zero-knowledge: An algorithm S such as x ∈ Ln for all non-uniform algo-
rithms D, for all d > 0, and all sufficiently large n,
|Pr(s R←− V iew(n, x) : Dn(s) = 1)−Pr(s R←− S(1n, x) : Dn(s)− 1)| < n−d, (3)
where,
V iew(n, x) =
{
σ
R←− {0, 1}nc ;Proof R←− Prover(σ, x) : (x, σ, Proof)
}
(4)
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The authors of [30] have adopted ZKP for identity verification with emphasis
on completeness where valid inputs can be proved on any protocol run and150
soundness where no malicious P or V can derive the secret from the interactions.
Several authentication schemes seem to have incorporated ZKPs particularly
within the context of Privacy Enhancement Technologies (PET), electronic vot-
ing schemes, anonymous blacklisting systems, and prevention of Denial of Ser-
vice (DoS) attacks [31], [32],[33],[34]. Common across all approaches is the155
obligation of each participant to prove certain honesty in the execution of au-
thentication processes. The ZKP in all cases plays a critical role in concealing
the sensitive information within the network. The number of the required sub-
sequent rounds of proof required and the associate cost of resources remains an
issue in the construction of each ZKP. However, ZKP can be a perfect authen-160
tication candidate in cases that use of password-based approaches and PKI are
either computationally expensive or impractical. Typical scenarios include au-
thentication for the IoT with low or intermitted connectivity and strict energy
preservation requirements related to the computational complexity of security
operations.165
The authors in [35] use a graph isomorphism-based scheme with a well de-
fined ZKP problem where graphs are expected to grow in order to satisfy the
security requirements. The authors introduced a variant of NIZKP using a
single message to verify the knowledge. They also introduced the notion of
different levels of security as a function of the number of challenges exchanged170
increasing the level of safety for the V . The use of the cryptographic cutting
function has been used as a key requirement within the scheme to fulfil the
computational assumptions about the cryptographic checksum needed. This
scheme uses broadcast messages to identify legitimate network nodes and the
commitment is decrypted only if decryption of the previous submitted messages175
is successful. The results were emphasised in the polynomial tendancy between
the size of the segments and the number of nodes of the graph that represents
the network. The authors have also investigated the segment generation time
with different devices as a function of the serialisation of graphs. As expected
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they reported high computational time to build the package although some cost180
was attributed to the programming language used for the implementation.
Merkle trees and predetermined timestamps have been used in a scheme
introduced by [36]. Many cryptographic schemes deploy Merkle trees that es-
tablish specific relationships between a tree leaf value and the root node value
so as the authenticity of the latter can be established. Sibling leaves are com-185
bined and hashed to form a parent leaf repetitively. The traversal mechanism
developed allows the values from all leaves to be stored outside the memory
space which is regarded as a resource intensive and inefficient process [37].
The problem of information leakage has been researched in peer-to-peer
(P2P) authentication systems as a key component of the security resistance190
of identity-based approaches. The authors of [38] introduced a pseudo-trust
scheme where ZKP is used for authentication using anonymous communica-
tions. The resistance of the scheme was tested against certain man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attacks using universal hashing and ZKP as an approach to
bind pseudo-identities to the authentication paths. A similar approach has195
been presented in [39] to address phishing and eavesdropping in single-sign-on
services (SSO) and transmission of user profiles across multiple platforms such
as mobile phones and web applications. The potential to increase privacy and
security using ZKP has been recently exploited in blockchain applications using
a modified version of Di Crescenzo and Lipmaa’s protocol in [40]. The work200
reduces the size of both the proofs and the computational complexity required
for the verification process. Initial data can also be obtained by device finger-
printing and geo-fencing techniques that allow the verification to be completed
prior to the creation of the authentication challenge [41].
A common concern amongst the reviewed literature is the adaptation of205
ZKP protocols for the transmission of assets across a distributed P2P blockchain
network. This area seems to attract much of the research efforts with focus on
the privacy preservation aspects of the communication [? ],[42]. The transaction
verification is the only piece of information needed without exposing information
about the sender, the recipient or assets.210
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The demand for lightweight authentication schemes in the IoT domain and
their importance has driven certain developments in the use of ZKP as a vi-
able solution [43], [44], [45]. Finally, the authors in [46] define a web security
model consists of multiple layers such as the interface, application, and database
to execute control functionalities and optimise authentication and application215
versatility.
3. NIZKP Design
Our NIZKP protocol consists of two main authentication components, namely
the client and server module described in Sec. 3.1. During the communication
initiation phase, the NIZKP client module sends to NIZKP server module the220
root node hash to be used as the public commitment for the challenge. The
NIZKP client module then proceeds to decimate the Merkle tree, nodes not
selected for use in the challenge which are no longer required are destroyed.
The NIZKP client module examines the configuration for the minimum number
of challenges required to build the challenge packet (defined by configuration).225
The NIZKP client module then selects the initial candidate nodes for the chal-
lenge packet, starting at the appropriate level in the Merkle Tree 1. For each
candidate selected, a secondary binary selection will determine if the candidate
or both candidate’s child nodes will be selected for the packet. This recursive
process will ensure that the NIZKP client module will always produce a chal-230
lenge packet with the minimum required number of challenges but may also
contain a random number of challenges between the minimum challenge value
and the maximum node size for the tree. (e.g., Desired challenges = 32, Max
Tree Nodes = 512, Challenge Packet Size = min32 → max512).
Given the IoT object’s limited computational resources and potential for235
limited network connectivity, this research proposes an authentication proto-
col based on NIZKP. Where such proofs are utilised, the requirement to store
1e.g., desired challenges = 32, Initial tree level = 32log2
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Figure 2: ZKP Client Server Simulation Flow.
authentication information, such as password hashes, is removed therefore to
reduce the exposure to attack. NIZKP produces a commitment set of data and
provides increased levels of flexibility for authentication in environments with-240
out Internet connectivity that often prevents the use of existing schemes based
on certification authorities.
The client authentication module produces graphs G1 and G2 (See Fig. 2).
Graph G1 is generated automatically and G2 is an isomorphism of G1. The per-
mutation produced by G2 constitutes our secret to be shared between the ZKP245
server and the V . A third party graph H will be generated as an isomorphism of
G1. G1, G2, H are shared between the client and ZKP server modules. The P
between all graphs claims a shared isomorphism. Graphs from G1, G2 are ran-
domly selected by the server and returned to the authentication client to enable
isomorphism between each graph and H. When isomorphism is returned by the250
client in case that G1 is selected the return is structured as pi−1 : H → G1.
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The server’s permutation is used to confirm that H is indeed isomorphic to the
V ’s chosen graph(s) and accepts the P ’s (P ) claim. The probability of a single
graph isomorphic to H is 50% for P including guessing the graph chosen by V .
The V can increase confidence with a challenge repeated until P ′s legitimacy255
is established. Each repeated challenge reduces the probability of guessing the
outcome as 12
n
(chosen graph) thus, increasing the legitimacy of the commit-
ment to V . The authentication attempt is invalidated in cases that P fails to
provide an appropriate solution. Once the commitment cycle is completed, both
V is unaware of the secret, and P can not alter the publicly shared value for260
that run of the commitment protocol.
The development and testing of our NIZKP adheres to certain assumptions
around its design. The nonces used are not predictable thus replay attacks based
on responses are not feasible. The trust relationships in the protocol design have
been explicitly defined with every message exchanges’ in the challenge packets265
(See Fig. 3). During our protocol execution, it is easy to deduce to which run
each message belongs into with clear conditions defined. The internal mechanics
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of the algorithm provide the conditions for messages to be acted upon. Although
in this work the protocol does not dictate the encryption scheme to be used, the
provision for it existing as part of our future work. The assumption is that our270
protocol supports widely acceptable standards such as iterative block ciphers
for the formation and transmission of the encrypted challenge.
3.1. NIZKP Authentication Modules
The NIZKP client module P , generates a 256bit random number as the base
data values for a Merkle tree to be build (See Fig. 3). SHA-256 is used for the275
leaf node creation LNX creation which includes the checksum value of the lowest
level of the Merkle tree with the total count calculated by nodecount = (LN ∗
2)− 1 Under the operation of the NIZKP client module, a pair of sibling nodes
are concatenated, and their resulting value is hashed. This value is the parent
node value PN = H(SNn + SNn+1) with the two contributing nodes being its280
children. The process only stops when a final single value is calculated, namely
the root node hash. The whole packet processing capability and simulation flow
for our protocol are illustrated in Fig. 4, 5.
The first communication step involves the root node hash value as public
information for the creation of the challenge. The nodes that no longer needed285
in the challenge process are automatically discarded. The challenge packet is
constructed using a minimum number of challenges and examined by the client
using a configuration template. The client authentication module selects the
candidates for the challenge packet from an appropriate level in the Merkle
tree. We define this tree level to 32log2 with 32 required challenges. A separate290
algorithmic process decides on the selection of the candidates’ child nodes as
part of the construction of the challenge packet. This step is to assure that the
selection is always limited to input with enough entropy given the maximum
node size of the tree.
During the verification process, a solution to the commitment is requested by295
V and P supplies the values for the challenge packet previously computed from
the Merkle tree in a specially crafted packet. The NIZKP commitment process is
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split into two phases including the actual commitment and verification involving
both P and V sharing a universal root hash as calculated and shared by P . A
selection of modes from the Merkle tree is sent from P to V for processing as300
part of the verification process. Successful verification of the root node hash by
V renders the authentication attempt as successful.
3.2. Simulation Setup and Datasets
A series of simulations have been run following the principles in [47] to con-
struct the essential client/server communications with all elements coded in305
Python using common design patterns. Traffic handling is achieved through
Python sockets and the authentication modules of NIZKP have been imple-
mented using dedicated message blocks. These simulations have been used to
collect primary data for each device utilising our protocol. Our simulations
utilise a single threaded socket client/server for auditing and logging. Each au-310
thentication algorithm will be tested using the same device code for consistency
across our experiments using common test harness during simulations. The ap-
propriate authentication module code was looped to fulfil the required number
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of iterations during testing.
The datasets created as part of our simulations consist of a combination315
of both ZKP and NIZKP with sample sizes of N = 10, 000. We estimated
5,000 iterations for each pair to provide 10,000 results. The tests were repeated
for challenge requests of 16, 32, 64, 128 and 256 against each proof creating a
final dataset of N = 50, 000 for each replicated test. We employ a positivist
philosophy to eliminate self-developed constructs and measure only observable,320
repetitive and comparative dataset leading to re-producible scientific outputs.
We also constructed a clear set of hypotheses for testing, which is described in
Section 4.
4. Results and discussion
The data collected during our experiments is used for the evaluation of the325
client authentication module. Client authentication will be tested against each
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algorithm using an increasing number of proof challenges, analogous to increas-
ing confidence in the authentication. A Two way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
with replication is used to test the data and formulate three null hypotheses to
be examined as follows:330
Hypothesis 1 (H1): H0: The number of challenges do not have any signifi-
cant effect on the response. Ha: Rejection of the First Null Hypothesis means
the number of challenges is significant.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): H0: The authentication proof algorithm does not have a
significant effect on the response. Ha: Rejection of the Second Null Hypothesis335
means the authentication proof algorithm factor is significant.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): H0: The interaction between the challenges and authen-
tication proof does not pose a significant effect on the response. Ha: Rejection of
the Third Null Hypothesis means that an effect from the interaction of challenges
and authentication proof algorithm factors is significant.340
The choice of the client authentication time, from initiation of authentica-
tion request to receipt of successful authentication, has been selected to test the
proposed theory. Using a NIZKP, will preclude other measurement metrics, e.g.,
NIZKP will always use less network traffic by design so this must be excluded,
less traffic and associated overhead means measurement of traffic size must also345
be excluded. The outcome measurement will consider time as a dependant vari-
able. This will not be a consideration for the determination of the result alone
as multiple factors can influence running time and so is usually considered a
poor metric to observe, but rather as a ratio difference of performance between
the two algorithms. Should the design of the experiment or simulations used to350
gather data be flawed, any analysis results based on that data set is of ques-
tionable quality. Data gathered during the simulations are used for statistical
study using an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) statistical model. Any informed
decisions based on this study are only as sound as the methods used to obtain
the data. A longitudinal time horizon involving repeated observations of the355
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same variables has been employed to provide large numbers of repeated samples
from which to perform analysis and inform conclusions. The datasets are tested
prior to the final analyses to ensure that the data gathered from the simulation
is appropriate for factorial testing.
The simulation experiments used in this study produced data sets derived by360
repeated measurement on the same set of subjects under differing conditions.
Pairing occurs where subject groups are linked and values are related. The
proof challenge number were deliberately paired to match baseline characteris-
tics providing appropriate data for two-way ANOVA testing. A confidence level
of %95 has been used throughout our testing with any observed value during365
our p-value analysis below 0.005 rejecting our hypotheses. Alternatively, the
null hypothesis is accepted given the observed factor has no effect on the result.
The data has been tested against Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity to compare the
correlation matrix to the identity matrix to avoid redundancy between variables.
A failure in the test should indicate a correlation matrix identical to an iden-370
tity matrix. Since an alternative authentication protocol is proposed we only
observe the results of the BTS with p ≤ .050. The testing hypothesis H0 : state
the variance is identical or Ha : at least one of the variances is different from
another. For Bartlett’s test, the computed p-value is lower than the significance
level (α = 0.05), the risk to reject the null hypothesis H0 while it is true is lower375
than 0.01% (See Table 1).
We also measured the sampling accuracy on our simulation data using Kaiser-
Mayer-Olking test (KMO). Compact correlation patterns are indicated by re-
sults close to 1 rendering the factors distinct and reliable in our factor analysis.
The results of the KMO test deemed as just acceptable if the result is > 0.5,380
average 0.5 ∼ 0.7, good for 0.7 ∼ 0.8, and excellent for > 0.8. For each dataset
paired KMO values were separated and results obtained with a range spread
to indicate appropriateness. The data gathered was an excellent candidate for
factorial testing (See Table 2). A two-way ANOVA allowed the examination of
two factors in a single experiment where we facilitate repeated data collection.385
To ensure accurate and reproducible results we also considered the following
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Table 1: Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity
Chi-square (Observed value) 267.485
Chi-square (Critical value) 16.919
DF 9
p-value (Two-tailed) <0.0001
alpha 0.05
factors: (1) The experiment consists of two participants (client, server) with
standard data logging and collection methods. All modified authentication pro-
tocols have been included as part of the participants’ interaction during our
simulations. (2) Each round of authentication is considered as a single test.390
(3) We performed tests in cycles of 1,000 and replicated five times for each
configuration of authentication challenges. We used Measured System Analysis
(MSA) to measure the accuracy and precision in data collection. MSA is used
as mean to quantify the accuracy, precision and stability of an experimental de-
sign in terms of the data produced. This allows us to experimentally determine395
the amount of variations existed within our measurement process and quantify
variability in our results during the hypotheses testing. MSA is effective in
our experiments to assure that data collected and analysed is appropriate for
increasing the reliability during our testing and determine the likely source of
variation in our data.400
The analysis on the homogeneity of variance in the group data was based on
the hypothesis that (H0) there are differences between variables and (Ha) there
are no differences between variables. The test against the collected dataset seeks
to explore the significance of variance between the authentication algorithm and
the number of challenges performed.405
Table 3 illustrates the statistical significance between the authentication
algorithm and challenges. Further changes to either the algorithm or the chal-
lenges will have a significant impact on the time required to complete a single
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Table 2: Kaiser-Meyer-Olking Measure of Sampling Accuracy
KMO Measure of Samp. Accur.
NI ZKP 16 0.995
ZKP 16 0.986
NI ZKP 32 0.994
ZKP 32 0.933
NI ZKP 64 0.995
ZKP 64 0.943
NI ZKP 128 0.995
ZKP 128 0.979
NI ZKP 256 0.994
ZKP 256 0.989
KMO 0.977
Table 3: ANOVA Test 1: Significance of Algorithm and Challenges
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Algorithm 1 0.8956 0.8956 1155.6 <2e-16 ***
Challenges 4 1.8327 0.4582 591.2 <2e-16 ***
Residuals 1494 1.1579 0.0008
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Table 4: Tukey Multiple Pairwise-Comparison
Difference Lower Value Upper Value p adj.
x32-x16 0.004218603 0.002409931 0.006027276 0
x64-x16 0.01725294 0.015444267 0.019061613 0
x128-x16 0.043104083 0.041295411 0.044912756 0
x256-x16 0.095028167 0.093219494 0.096836839 0
x64-x32 0.013034337 0.011225664 0.014843009 0
x128-x32 0.03888548 0.037076807 0.040694153 0
x256-x32 0.090809563 0.089000891 0.092618236 0
x128-x64 0.025851143 0.024042471 0.027659816 0
x256-x64 0.077775227 0.075966554 0.079583899 0
x256-x128 0.051924083 0.050115411 0.053732756 0
Table 5: Pairwise T-Test
X16 X32 X64 X128
X32 0.16 - - -
X64 1.8e-08 2.0e-05 - -
x128 <2e-16 <2e-16 <2e-16 -
X256 <2e-16 <2e-16 <2e-16 <2e-16
protocol run. The significance of the impact has been measured through the ex-
amination of the factors’ interaction and the results determine whether the null410
hypotheses H0, Ha can be accepted or rejected as a function of the significance
level of p (if p ≤ .50, H0 should be rejected and Ha is accepted).
Table 6 also shows a statistical significance between the interaction of the
factors algorithm and the challenges where the p-value (< 2e− 16) of algorithm
is significant indicates association between its selection and the authentication415
challenge’s duration. The p-value (< 2e − 16) of challenge is significant indi-
cates an associative relationship between the number of challenges required and
the duration of the authentication challenge. Finally, the p-value (< 2e − 16)
for the interaction between the two factors indicates a strong dependence of
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the duration of authentication challenge and the relationship of algorithm and420
challenges. Significant p-value results also indicate differences between group
means.
This difference can be better understood by a multiple pairwise-comparison
test (See Table 4). The adjusted p-values for each of the pairwise-comparison
for the authentication challenges reported results of significance (padj. < 0.5).425
Table 5 illustrates the significance in the combinations confirmed by a pairwise
t-test following correction for multiple testing. A normal distribution is assumed
following the ANOVA tests carried out including the homogeneity of variance
(Fig 6). The Residuals vs Fitted plot is used to check for violations in our
model assumptions, in particular, any occurrences of heteroscedasticity, non-430
linear relationships among the response variables and predictors, unequal error
variances and detected outliers. The Residuals versus Fitted plot shows no
evidence of association between fitted values and residuals (detected outliers but
fall within acceptable criteria), therefore homogeny of variances can be assumed.
The results from the Bartlett’s test are consistent with this observation. The435
data presents a normal distribution as reported by both ANOVA and Shapiro-
Wilk test against ANOVA residuals (W = 0.89995, p − value < 2.2e − 16).
The ANOVA testing assumes variance is equal across samples and that sample
data is normally distributed. If unequal group sizes are used during ANOVA
testing, homogeneity of variance will be violated. Large sample variances when440
observed in small sample sizes can lead to underestimating the significance level
and falsely rejecting the null hypothesis. Conversely, where large variances
are observed in large group sizes, the significance level may be overestimated,
decreasing the validity of the tests performed.
Fig. 7 illustrates the normality plot of residuals with data following the445
reference line which shows that our sample data is valid. Based on this analy-
sis of the collected data, the results and accuracy of the ANOVA testing, the
hypotheses can be evaluated against these findings.
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Table 6: ANOVA Test 2: Significance of Interaction of Auth. Algorithm and Challenges
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Algorithm 1 0.8956 0.8956 13614 <2e-16 ***
Challenges 4 1.8327 0.4582 6965 <2e-16 ***
Algorithm:Challenges 4 1.0598 0.2650 4028 <2e-16 ***
Residuals 1490 0.0980 0.0001
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Figure 6: Residuals Vs Fitted Plot.
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4.1. Hypothesis Testing
We introduced multiple rounds of challenges in our simulations to probe450
on algorithm’s performance and the effect of the increased challenges to the
its overall authentication overhead. Given that a V must be of the legitimacy
of a P , we repeat the protocol rounds to decrease the probability of guessing
the answers to the V ’s challenges. Hypothesis 1 (H1) proves no significant
effect on the authentication times on the client device, as a function of the455
increased challenges used in the authentication protocol. The ANOVA test
shown noticeable results for H1 as challenges p-value is smaller than (p ≤ .050)
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Figure 8: Effect of Authentication Challenges.
rendering the value insignificant (See Fig. 8).
• Rejected - H0: There is no significant effect from the number of chal-
lenges factor on the response.460
• Accepted - Ha: Rejection of the First Null Hypothesis, the number of
challenges is significant.
For Hypothesis 2 (H2) we focused on the implementation of two different
ZKP algorithms with multiple rounds of challenges used as a block to allow the
V to build confidence in P ’s claim. The NIZKP focuses on the same operation465
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Figure 9: Effect of Authentication Algorithm.
where multiple proofs are created and processed in batches removing the neces-
sity for a repeated communication between the the P and the V . All challenges
are sent to the V using a single communication and the V accepts or rejects
the proof after processing the message received. Hypothesis 2 H0 predicts no
significant effect from the authentication proof factor on the response indicating470
significance of the former. Also, results suggest that p-value is smaller than the
significance level (p ≤ .050) as illustrated in Fig. 9.
• Rejected - H0: No significant effect from the authentication proof algo-
rithm on the response.
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• Accepted - Ha: Rejection of the Second Null Hypothesis, the authentica-475
tion proof algorithm factor is significant.
Our simulations used both interactive and non-interactive methods for the
authentication process with increased number of challenges. While both meth-
ods use ZKP actions to realise their operation, the communication and inter-
action profiles between them are different. Their effectiveness is demonstrated480
through the modification of challenges in each round of the authentication pro-
cess for each method. Hypothesis 3 (H3), predicts that there is no significant
effect from the interaction of challenges and authentication proof algorithm fac-
tors on the response (See Fig. 10. Again, a significant result is returned from
the ANOVA test, the Algorithm p-value is again many times smaller than the485
level of significance (p ≤ .050).
• Rejected - H0: There is no significant effect from the interaction of chal-
lenges and authentication proof algorithm factors on the response.
• Accepted - Ha: Rejection of the Third Null Hypothesis means that ef-
fect from the interaction of challenges and authentication proof algorithm490
factors are significant.
Throughout all the simulations and consecutive analyses, a statistically sig-
nificant difference has been identified between the authentication protocols and
their interactions with increased number of challenges. For each of our hy-
potheses the difference of α 0.5 and p − value resulted on accepting only the495
alternative hypotheses in each case.
5. Threat Model
Our NIZKP protocol provides mitigation from existing threat vectors both in
current proposal state and the features introduced in its future developments.
We identify a class of attacks prominent to our case with an explanation on500
both the potential attack vectors and mitigations in place as part of NIZKP’s
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Figure 10: Effect of Interaction of Algorithm and Challenges.
interactions. Authentication requests should not be routed through the IoT
device, especially when the gateway acts as the registration authority for the
network. If such routing is permitted getaway bypass attacks might be possible.
Since hash trees are used to construct the authentication chain, our protocol can505
form the basis for future meshed mutual authentication schemes in IoT networks.
Threat mitigation on the client side against a stolen V attack has been mitigated
in our scheme as there is no password transmitted. Therefore, password guessing
is infeasible against NIZKP as the way our challenge is calculated renders this
attack vector unusable.510
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Although an adversary could sample the authentication challenge for multi-
ple client authentication requests against a uniquely identified UUID, there are
no values stored at any stage in the authentication process [48]. In the scenario
of node impersonation and replay attacks, an adversary may be able to imper-
sonate a sensor node and by accessing secret values such as the temporal client515
UUID, he or she might be able to re-create the challenge. The proposed audit-
ing and logging of authentication requests from a client against UUIDs and the
published root node hash for each session, prevents an adversary from replaying
the challenge or injecting a challenge packet based on rebuild sample values.
When nodes, sensors are deployed in unattended environments, they become520
susceptible to node capture attacks. In a node capture attack, any sensor or
entity with the network can act as an adversary whereby they can capture, re-
program and re-deploy a node within the target network [49]. This attack can
lead to significant security and privacy risks within the environment. Without
proper network monitoring procedures in place, device absence as a result of a525
physical capture can not be noticed [50], [51]. This type of attacks can render
further attacks such as Sybil and selective forwarding possible.
In cases that the same hash function is used for both leaves and branch
nodes in the Merkle tree structure it would be possible to generate collisions
or even second preimages with arbitrary values. If for example m is a message530
longer than the segment size of the hash tree, hinternal be the internal hashing
function and the leaf hash function hleaf , then the hashing value of m can
be calculated as: h(m) = hinternal(hleaf (m0)||hleaf (m1), where m0, m1 are
the different segments of m. If a m′ exist such that m′ 6= m and h(m′) =
hleaf (m
′) = hleaf (hleaf (m0)||hleaf (m1)) if hleaf = hinternal then h(m′) = h(m)535
that can constitute a second preimage attack.
Authors in [52] have introduced several preimage attacks against the dithered
variants of the Merkle-Damgard mode of operation. Further attacks have been
recorded in the literature with regards to the application of Merkle trees in
several applications such as bitcoin and Blockchain networks [53]. Often, these540
applications do not distinguish between inner nodes and leaf nodes, thus the
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length of the tree is often implicitly given by the number of corresponding
transactions inside the network. An exhaustive discussion on these attacks is
outside the scope of our work. We have also identified that adversaries can
extract configuration information and impersonate legitimate participants dur-545
ing the authentication process. All pre-cautions must be taken to ensure the
configuration between the gateway and the sensor is encrypted, leading to an
unforgeable Merkle tree generation. Mitigation of this risk has been considered
in our future work where device specific fingerprinting is utilised in the provision
of uniquely identifiable information as part of NIZKP’s operation.550
6. Conclusion and future work
This work seeks to articulate the design, development and the preliminary
quantitative study of a novel authentication protocol based on NIZKP. Our
NIZKP protocol has been designed specifically to offer performance and quality
enhancements for the authentication challenges in resource constraint networks555
with clear identification of existing security threats. An experiment was de-
signed to compare the performance of our protocol that utilises NIZKP based
on Merkle trees against a traditional ZKP approach using graph isomorphism.
We developed a set of statistical experiments to validate hypotheses based on
key metrics on observation data produced by our simulations. Throughout the560
analysis, we rejected all null hypotheses namely the number of authentication
challenges issued by the protocol and effects on performance, interactions and
effects on performance, and protocols’ operation and their effect on performance.
We have identified that the construction of the Merkle Tree grants further in-
vestigation including the processing of the packet challenge, node recall and tree565
traversal as fundamental components in the creation of more resource-efficient
algorithms. Also, although SHA256 has been used as the de-facto algorithm
in our work, its effectiveness in resource contraint environments must be exam-
ined further. Further improvements might be possible utilising hashes such as
LOCHA.570
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Although the hash values used in our challenge pack at time restricted,
further evaluation is needed on the data protection processes introduced during
the calculation of these hashes. Our simulations use randomly generated data
values to seed the nodes during the Merkle tree creation. We are currently
seeking optimal solutions to obtain the seeding data for the data nodes in a575
cryptographically resistant manner while verifying the creation of the Merkle
tree.
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